Wil Waluchow’s notion of Community’s Constitutional Morality (CCM) was developed as a tool for the identification of moral norms and considered judgments that are in some way tied to a community’s constitutional law and practices. In this paper I first argue that even though the tool was conceived under a state-based paradigm, it also works on a global scale. Then, I show how by relying on this tool we can achieve two important and clearly differentiable goals. The first goal relates (...) to efforts regarding the construction of global theories of justice. By using Waluchow’s CCM we can overcome what I call the problem of adjudication among differentexisting moral intuitions. That is, the need to choose between different and competing fundamental moral commitments that ought to guide our moral deliberations. Instead, by using CCM, we can identify Embodied Moral Intuitions that hold an epistemic advantage over Personal Moral Intuitions, which are commonly used to ground normative projects. The second goal relates to contemporary efforts to decolonize our perspectives about justice, domestic and global. By relying on Waluchow’s notion of CCM, the reality that Indigenous knowledge, despite it not having been properly acknowledged in most philosophical academic debates, is already a part of our debates about global justice becomes undeniable and a call for action to further expand our understanding of global political morality. (shrink)

The role of science rhetoric in the global village -- Scientific English in the postmodern age -- Problematizing the rhetoric of contemporary science -- A contrastive rhetoric approach to science dissemination -- Disciplinary practices and procedures within research sites -- Triangulating procedures, practices and texts in scientific discourse -- ELF and a more complex sociolinguistic landscape -- Re-defining the rhetoric of science.

One of the causes of the rebirth that the philosophy of being of Thomas Aquinas has been experiencing since the middle of the last century is, without a doubt, the impact of the studies carried out on this subject by the French medievalist, Étienne Gilson. Spurred on by the onto-theological critique of M. Heidegger, Gilson and other Thomists, made common cause to clarify the scope of the Heideggerian invective, which judged that Aquinas’s metaphysics of being would also have fallen into (...) an essentialism or reification of being. The proposal of these authors focused on highlighting the original notion of being (actus essendi) in front of interpreters (some from the Thomist school itself) who would have obscured its meaning, fundamentally its supreme current value. In the opinion of Gilson, Fabro and others, the main cause of this blurring would be the identification of being and existence. My objective in this article is to critically analyze some positions of contemporary Thomism and justify the impossibility of identifying what Thomas Aquinas calls esse by existence. (shrink)

El propósito de este artículo es el de analizar las condiciones y potencialidades derivadas de la fijación en el pasado que caracteriza a algunas producciones culturales del exilio español de 1939. Profundizando en la noción de “temporalidad exílica”, recuperaremos el debate contemporáneo en torno a su proyección en la España democrática. Desde el interior del mismo, ofreceremos argumentos a través de una indagación filosófica sobre la noción de melancolía que intenta trascender los enfoques clásicos respecto a la misma. En base (...) a esta interpretación, defenderemos que la recuperación de un pretérito doloroso por parte de los exiliados que regresaron a España no es un índice de una memoria patológica y auto-complaciente. Al contrario, es la semilla para revelar los déficits y lagunas del proceso transicional español; en lo que se refiere a la recuperación simbólica y material de las víctimas asociadas al bando vencido en la guerra civil. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is rather modest: we do not intend to reconstruct Aristotle’s theory of truth (although we are convinced that there is such a thing), and we will not try to settle the issue concerning Bivalence in Aristotle. We merely want, on the one hand, to argue for the consistency between the main Aristotelian texts on truth and a possible rejection of Bivalence; and on the other hand, to investigate the conditions of a possible counterexample to Bivalence. (...) The motivation for this research is also very specific. We are interested in the apparent violation of Bivalence introduced by vague predicates, and in particular we want to respond to a family of arguments put forward by T. Williamson in support of the idea that allowing for exceptions to Bivalence would be incoherent. We have focused on these arguments for two reasons. On the one hand, what is allegedly threatened by a denial of Bivalence is no less than the very “nature of truth or falsity”. On the other hand, Aristotle is explicitly mentioned as one of the defendants of this “natural” conception of truth, and we are reminded about the connection between Aristotle’s theory and Tarski’s semantic conception. These arguments, therefore, give us an occasion to explore Aristotle’s analysis of the nature of truth and falsity, and to examine its connection with the Tarskian conception of truth. In particular, we would like to question the assumption, which has become a commonplace in the field of analytical philosophy, that Aristotle’s notion of truth can be encoded in the pair of disquotational biconditionals that derive from Tarski’s “T schema”. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to analyze the relationship between phenomenal experience and our folk conceptualization of it. I will focus on the phenomenal concept strategy as an answer to Mary's puzzle. In the first part I present Mary's argument and the phenomenal concept strategy. In the second part I explain the requirements phenomenal concepts should satisfy in order to solve Mary's puzzle. In the third part I present various accounts of what a phenomenal concept is, and I show (...) the difficulties each of them have. Finally, I develop my own account of phenomenal concepts. My thesis claims that phenomenal concepts are complex concepts whose possession conditions depend upon the mastery of many other concepts, in fact, quite complex concepts such as the distinction between appearance and reality (which belongs to our theory of mind system), and color concepts (at least in the case of the phenomenal concepts needed in order to account for Mary's case). And these later concepts are concepts that have special possession conditions: they include the deployment of nonconceptual recognitional capacities. (shrink)

This work begins by proposing the need for exploring the mode of being of mental disorders. It is a philosophical study in an Aristotelian perspective, with special emphasis on the anthropological–cultural dimension. It is difficult for such an inquiry to be carried out from within psychiatry or clinical psychology, committed as these fields are to their own logic and practical conditions. The issues are, in any case, more ontological than strictly clinical in nature. We therefore turn to Aristotle, and specifically (...) his doctrine of the four “causes,” to flesh out the social and cultural dimensions of mental disorders. In accordance with the present analysis, the material cause of disorders would be found in the contingencies of life; the formal cause would pertain primarily to the way clinical conditions themselves can serve as models of ‘being ill’ in our society; the efficient cause would correspond to the patients themselves, understood as active (albeit less than fully conscious) agents as well as to the pharmaceutical industry and the mass media; the final cause would be found in different adaptive functions served by the disorder. We conclude that the “mode of being” of most (if not all) mental disorders—in particular, their status as mental disorders—can often have more to do with cultural forms than with biological factors. (shrink)

Recent years have seen a surge in online collaboration between experts and amateurs on scientific research. In this article, we analyse the epistemological implications of these crowdsourced projects, with a focus on Zooniverse, the world’s largest citizen science web portal. We use quantitative methods to evaluate the platform’s success in producing large volumes of observation statements and high impact scientific discoveries relative to more conventional means of data processing. Through empirical evidence, Bayesian reasoning, and conceptual analysis, we show how information (...) and communication technologies enhance the reliability, scalability, and connectivity of crowdsourced e-research, giving online citizen science projects powerful epistemic advantages over more traditional modes of scientific investigation. These results highlight the essential role played by technologically mediated social interaction in contemporary knowledge production. We conclude by calling for an explicitly sociotechnical turn in the philosophy of science that combines insights from statistics and logic to analyse the latest developments in scientific research. (shrink)

Reflexión sobre el desafío al que nos enfrentamos los docentes si deseamos integrar la inteligencia artificial (IA) en la educación, sin perder de vista los valores humanos y la esencia de la enseñanza. La importancia de encontrar un equilibrio entre la tradición y la innovación, con el objetivo de apoyarnos en la tecnología como una herramienta para enriquecer la interacción humana en el aula. La clave está en aprovechar el potencial de la IA para reforzar la experiencia educativa, sin perder (...) de vista el valor insustituible del vínculo humano en el proceso de aprendizaje. (shrink)

A realistic axiomatic formulation of nonrelativistic quantum mechanics for a single microsystem with spin is presented, from which the most important theorems of the theory can be deduced. In comparison with previous formulations, the formal aspect has been improved by the use of certain mathematical theories, such as the theory of equipped spaces, and group theory. The standard formalism is naturally obtained from the latter, starting from a central primitive concept: the Galilei group.

This paper examines the concept of objectivity traceable in Francis Bacon's natural philosophy. After some historical background on this concept, it considers the question of whether it is not an anachronism to attribute such a concept to Bacon, since the word ‘objectivity’ is a later coinage and does not appear anywhere in his writings. The essay gives reasons for answering this question in the negative, and then criticizes the accounts given of Bacon's understanding of objectivity by Lorraine Daston and Julie (...) Robin Solomon. It argues that this understanding is most directly and fully expressed in his discussion of the idols of the mind. In this connection, the paper notes Bacon's critical attitude to sixteenth-century scepticism and its relevance to the idea of objectivity implicit in his comments on the idols. In conclusion, the paper argues that Bacon was not a pure empiricist and describes the place assigned to theories and hypotheses in his natural philosophy. (shrink)

El presente artículo parte de una definición de lo barroco, caracterizado como categoría y constante cultural (Hatzfeld, Maravall, Benjamin, D'Ors), con el fin de establecer su conexión con la idea de “crisis” (histórica, económica, epocal, de ideario e imaginario), y estudiar así la posibilidad de su repetibilidad en el curso histórico. Establecida dicha conexión entre lo barroco como categoría y la crisis como acontecimiento histórico, espiritual y cultural, abordaremos la raíces filosóficas y culturales de la crisis contemporánea (Schelling, Nietzsche, Jameson, (...) Derrida, Sloterdijk, Agamben, etc.) con la finalizar de establecer si la crisis contemporánea puede dar lugar a un renacimiento de lo barroco, a un neobarroco. (shrink)

Contemporary debates concerning warrant transmission take for granted this thesis: when warrant transmission fails the argument fails. I challenge this thesis. An argument with conclusion C, addressed to subject S, can be cogent in the sense that recognition that the premises entail (or make highly likely) C can rationally foster in S the belief in C, without the warrant for C necessarily being gained (or reinforced) by such recognition. A key idea is to accept that some arguments should be understood (...) in a way that involves the abandonment of two characteristic idealizations imposed on rational thinkers by Bayesian modelling. (shrink)

Este artículo expone el primero de tres análisis que componen una investigación sobre la cuestión del sujeto en la evaluación educativa en Latinoamérica. La evaluación es asumida como uno de los escenarios de conexión en el plexo de relaciones intersubjetivas, en cuyo interior es necesario aclarar el sentido de la noción de sujeto y sus procesos de constitución. Desde esta perspectiva se analiza la evaluación como fenómeno de experiencia humana y de interacción social. Se describe e interpreta la forma en (...) la que el sujeto se da a la experiencia y cómo desde ella se constituye y deviene en constituyente mediante las síntesis de estratos pasivos y activos. Se revela, entonces, una paradoja en sus procesos constitutivos en el escenario de la evaluación educativa. (shrink)

Creation mustn't be considerated as a production whose term is creature. Creature as such isn't a term but a beginning. Abandonment of mental limit is a necessary method to reach such a knowledge of creature.

This dissertation is the first step in a larger research project aimed at bridging the gap between Western philosophy and Indigenous thought. Here, I identify a useful methodological approach to the social contract by analyzing the tradition under an historical lens. I highlight that, along with the justificatory capacities of the social contract, comes a great deal of modelling involved in different versions of the social contract. This modelling comes in the form of four pre-contractual elements that different authors model (...) in different ways. I show how different authors choose different structural problems or injustices that such theories want to address, as well as normative commitments that their theories are committed to, a standard of considerability of interests that identifies whose interests matter for those deliberating the terms of the contract, and a contractual device. Once that has been established, I am able to provide some foundational elements for establishing a framework for the development of a theory of global justice. I focus on the first three pre-contractual elements. (shrink)

I intend to show some of the limits of the decision-theoretic model in connection with the analysis of cognitive agency. Although the concept of maximum expected utility can be helpful for explaining the decision-making process, it is certainly not the primary motor that moves agents to action. Moreover, it has been noticed elsewhere that this model is inadequate to the analysis of single cases of practical reasoning. A theory is proposed that introduces a plan-structure as a basic idea. In order (...) to know its very conceptual scope, we need to accommodate that theory to a cognitive architecture whereby the rational and autonomous agent makes choices and deliberates between courses of action to achieve specific goals that are of its interest. The paper endeavours also to clarify the relationship between the different modules that should constitute the architecture of an agent to accomplish the requisites of efficiency and autonomy in a changeable and dynamic world. (shrink)

Reducing health disparities and improving health outcomes are fundamental principles in global health. Environmental justice remains underrecognized and undervalued as a key driver of health dispar...

In 1980 L. M. de Rijk edited some texts connected with medieval disputation ( Die mittelaterlichen Traktate De modo opponendi et respondendi ), towards which he showed a strikingly contemptuous attitude. The reason for his contempt was that the treatises did not fit the obligationes and sophismata tradition. In this article I focus on the original version, the Thesaurus Philosophorum , to highlight the distinction of this family of treatises with respect to the “modern“ tradition. First, I study the features (...) of the disputation that can be recognised through the collection of fallacious arguments contained in the Thesaurus . Second, I briefly examine the contents of the treatise and their arrangement, showing that they are closely related to the kind of disputation in question. I hope to support the idea that neither the technique of disputation nor the contents and their arrangement deserve a straightforward rejection. (shrink)